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How We Feel: Collective Emotions Without 
Joint Commitments
Felipe León and Dan Zahavi
Abstract
This article engages critically with Margaret Gilbert’s proposal that joint commitments are 
necessary for collective emotions. After introducing Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment 
(Section 2), and the joint commitment account of collective emotions (Section 3), we argue 
in Section 4 that research from developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint 
commitments for collective emotions. In that section, we also raise a more principled objec-
tion to Gilbert’s account, independently of developmental considerations. Section 5 develops 
a complementary line of argument, focused on the notion of mutual recognition. While we 
agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition has an important role to play in an account 
of collective emotions, we take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual 
recognition in terms of the concept of joint commitment. We conclude by sketching an alter-
native analysis of collective emotions that highlights the role of interpersonal identification 
and socially mediated self-consciousness.
1. Introduction 
In the past decades, Margaret Gilbert has developed a distinctive philosophical 
approach to the analysis of a wide range of social phenomena, taking as the 
cornerstone of her analysis the concept of joint commitment (Gilbert, 1989, 
2013, 2018). The range of phenomena analysed by Gilbert is impressive. It 
includes not only collective belief and collective action, but also collective emo-
tions, mutual recognition, joint attention, promises, social conventions, and 
agreements (Gilbert, 2013). If, as argued by Gilbert, joint commitment is the 
“structure of the social atom” and the “foundation of human social behaviour” 
(Gilbert, 2003, p. 39), the concept of joint commitment would have a pervasive 
explanatory power, and be of obvious significance for understanding the struc-
ture of sociality. Without aiming at a comprehensive assessment of Gilbert’s 
rich and wide-ranging approach, in the following we will mainly focus on the 
case of collective emotion, a topic that Gilbert has engaged with over the years. 
There is a remarkable continuity in Gilbert’s treatment of collective emotions, 
in that she has throughout sought to account for them by means of her concept 
of joint commitment (Gilbert, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2014). Our main aim will 
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precisely be to test and assess the applicability of a joint commitment account 
when it comes to collective emotions. Are joint commitments really necessary 
for collective emotions, as Gilbert contends? 
The paper is structured as follows. After introducing Gilbert’s concept of 
joint commitment (Section 2), and the joint commitment account of col-
lective emotions (Section 3), we will argue in Section 4 that research from 
developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint commitments for 
collective emotions. In that section, we will also raise a more principled ob-
jection to Gilbert’s account, independently of developmental considerations. 
Section 5 develops a complementary line of argument, focused on the notion 
of mutual recognition. While we agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition 
has an important role to play in an account of collective emotions, we will 
take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual recognition 
in terms of the concept of joint commitment. In the last section of the paper, 
we will sketch an alternative analysis of collective emotions that highlights the 
role of interpersonal identification and socially mediated self-consciousness. 
2. Gilbert’s Concept of Joint Commitment
A central claim of Gilbert’s is that we cannot account for the social world in 
singularist terms. What we need if we are to do justice to, for instance, group 
formations such as families, sports teams and terrorist cells is an account that 
addresses head-on the nature of the collective ‘we’ (Gilbert, 2013, p. 5). For 
Gilbert, the latter cannot be understood as a mere stand-in for ‘we all’ or ‘we 
both’ (Gilbert, 2013, p. 65). A collective we is more than a mere aggregate of 
persons, just as a joint action is more than two people doing concurrent ac-
tions. It involves a sense of unity, it links the involved persons together in a way 
where they jointly constitute what Gilbert calls a ‘plural subject’. As she makes 
clear, the technical notion of plural subject should be understood in terms of 
the concept of joint commitment (Gilbert, 2013, p. 63). But how should we 
understand the concept of joint commitment?
One of Gilbert’s recurrent examples is taken from the domain of joint ac-
tion, and involves two people going for a walk together (Gilbert, 1990, 2013, 
pp. 24–25). According to Gilbert, for two or more persons jointly to commit 
themselves to go for a walk together is for them to be normatively constrained 
in a specific way. The constraint in question is specific both in terms of its 
formation and its outcome (Gilbert, 2018). In the first place, it arises from the 
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persons’ recognized expression of readiness to jointly commit everyone in the 
group to a certain course of action (under conditions of common knowledge, 
i.e., assuming that such readiness is ‘out in the open’ for everyone in the group). 
Although a joint commitment might arise as a result of a prior explicit agree-
ment, the latter is not a necessary requirement (Gilbert, 2013, pp. 26, 33). The 
participating individuals must know what a joint commitment is in order to 
enter it, they must in fact possess the concept of joint commitment, but a joint 
commitment might nevertheless be established simply as a result of the indi-
viduals’ expression of readiness to participate in the joint action. This doesn’t 
have to involve verbal communication but might, for instance, come about as 
a result of mutual eye gaze. Secondly, the outcome of that process is distinctive 
in that it imposes normative pressure on all the committed persons to act as a 
body, i.e., to act as a unit or as one. In this sense (and only in this sense) the 
subject of a joint commitment is not singular, but plural (Gilbert, 2018, p. 137). 
For Gilbert, the notion of a plural subject consequently does not denote any 
kind of supra-individual group mind (Gilbert, 2013, pp. 9, 119), but is simply 
the name for any number of persons who because of a joint commitment are 
unified in a certain way (Gilbert, 2013, p. 63).
Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment can be further explicated by consid-
ering how it differs from the concept of personal commitment. One central 
difference between the two types of commitment is that a personal commit-
ment, but not a joint one, can be unilaterally made or rescinded (Gilbert, 
2018, p. 133). A joint commitment is thus not “a personal concatenation of 
personal commitments of the parties” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 7)—however one un-
derstands these personal commitments to be interrelated —, although this is 
not to deny that each party to a joint commitment has derivative “individual 
commitments”. However, differently from personal commitments, such indi-
vidual commitments depend upon a joint commitment, and are therefore not 
unilaterally establishable or rescindable (Gilbert, 2018, p. 134). Moreover, one 
important consequence of the irreducibility of joint commitments to personal 
commitments is that participants in a joint commitment have the right to 
issue demands and rebukes to other participants, in given situations. That 
is to say, participants have specific obligations to one another to conform to 
the joint commitment. The obligations engendered by joint commitments are 
neither legal nor moral, but nonetheless normative (Gilbert, 2013, pp. 5–6). 
For example, if while taking a walk together with you, I suddenly turn around 
and go my own way, you are entitled to rebuke me. Indeed, one central line 
of support for the appeal to joint commitment is precisely that it can explain 
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the appropriateness of the participant’s potential demands and rebukes to one 
another in such and similar situations (Gilbert, 2013, p. 88). 
3. Gilbert’s Joint Commitment Account of Collective Emotions
Many of Gilbert’s examples are taking from the domain of joint action: they 
are examples involving people doing something together. As Gilbert repeatedly 
insists, her aim is to construe “an adequate account of shared intention as one 
that provides individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions” (Gilbert, 
2013, p. 105). But what is primarily revealed in her analyses of joint action, 
namely the role played by joint commitments, is taken to hold true of other 
cases of shared intentionality as well. Just as people might be jointly committed 
to go for a walk together, they might be jointly committed to intend, believe, 
accept, value, or hate something together (Gilbert, 2013, p. 64). The notion of 
‘doing something together’ must consequently be construed broadly enough 
so as to include different types of psychological states, including believing, 
intending, and feeling something together (Gilbert, 2013, pp. 2, 33). 
In a number of publications, Gilbert has more specifically applied the joint 
commitment approach to the field of collective emotions, and has analysed in 
some detail collective remorse (Gilbert, 2000a) and collective guilt (Gilbert, 
2000b, 2002). Other types of shared emotions that she occasionally mentions 
and discusses are collective excitement, collective fear, and collective anger 
(Gilbert, 2014). Consider the case of collective excitement. In a nutshell, Gil-
bert’s account is the following: “Persons X, Y, and so on, are collectively excited 
if and only if they are jointly committed to be excited as a body” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. 23). As we have already seen, the expression “as a body” references the 
kind of unity that is taken to hold by taking part in a joint commitment. On 
Gilbert’s proposal, the analysis of joint action in terms of joint commitment 
can be extended to the case of collective emotions. Consequently, on the joint 
commitment account of collective emotions, normativity and normative pres-
sure play as significant a role as they do in the case of joint action. In particular, 
persons taking part in a collective emotion are entitled “to rebuke one another 
for behaviour that is not in the spirit of the collective emotion” (Gilbert, 2014, 
p. 23). Here is one illustrative example offered by Gilbert: “if, say, Alice, Ben, 
and Chris are jointly committed to be excited, as a body, over Stella’s win, 
then by virtue of that fact Ben and Chris have the standing to rebuke Alice for 
angrily bursting out “Why did Stella have to win another prize?,” given that her 
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outburst does not conform to the pertinent joint commitment” (Gilbert, 2014, 
p. 25). Having a collective emotion is, according to Gilbert, a matter of the 
participant’s “public performance”, rather than of what they might individually 
experience. Indeed, according to Gilbert, having a collective emotion does not 
require that the participants have corresponding personal emotions. In a collec-
tive emotion, “what goes on in each mind and heart is not at issue with respect 
to what the parties are committed to” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 25).
Like other cognitivist accounts of emotions, Gilbert’s account very much 
highlights the evaluative aspect of the emotions, and has less to say about their 
phenomenal character. Gilbert offers two types of justification for this strategy. 
First of all, she remains sceptical about the role of phenomenality (or as she 
phrases it, phenomenology) in emotions, regardless of whether we are dealing 
with individual or collective emotions.1 She notes that, even in the individual 
case, the role of conscious states in the constitution of emotions is open to de-
bate (Gilbert, 2014, p. 20). And if phenomenal character might not be essential 
for individuals’ emotions, why should it be essential for collective emotions? 
Moreover, even in those cases where Gilbert concedes that collective emo-
tions might involve concomitant feeling-sensations, she contends that their 
phenomenality doesn’t differ from the phenomenality of individual emotions. 
Whatever the difference between individual emotions and collective emotions 
might amount to, it is not a phenomenal difference. As Gilbert writes, “a pang 
is a pang is a pang” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 254). Rather, individual and collective 
emotions of the same emotion type differ in terms of the involved judgments 
or thoughts. 
Our main purpose in what follows is not to take issue with Gilbert’s general 
understanding of emotions and phenomenality, but to scrutinize the cogency 
of the joint commitment account of collective emotions. Are joint commit-
ments as central to collective emotions as Gilbert has argued? In particular, are 
joint commitments necessary for collective emotions? 
 1 Let us here simply state that we find Gilbert’s use of the terms ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phe-
nomenological’ problematic. As many other analytic philosophers, Gilbert is using these 
terms as synonyms for phenomenality, i.e., as labels for the qualitative character of experi-
ence. To discuss the role of phenomenology in emotions is consequently to discuss a certain 
dimension of experience. This obviously contrasts with those who—in our view, far more 
appropriately—use the terms to designate a specific method or tradition in philosophy. When 
thinkers like Scheler, Sartre or Heidegger offered phenomenological analyses of different 
emotions they most definitely did not simply seek to disclose or describe the qualitative 
character of specific feeling-sensations. In recent years, a number of approaches to collective 
emotions have been developed that give phenomenology a far more central role than Gilbert 
does (Schmid, 2009; Krueger, 2013; León, Szanto, & Zahavi, 2017).
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4. Are Joint Commitments Necessary for Collective Emotions?
Recall that on Gilbert’s account a joint commitment is a commitment of two 
or more people, where each party is answerable to all parties for any violation 
of the joint commitment, and where none is in a position to unilaterally rescind 
this commitment. An account like this seems tailor-made to deal with some 
cases of joint action, but is it also applicable to cases of shared affectivity? In 
some cases, probably yes. Consider, for instance, a situation where a group 
after some discussion reaches the following agreement: Any group member 
who reveals the secrets of the group to an outsider will be met with contempt 
and anger from the other group members. If the group members commit 
themselves to upholding this principle, and if on the occasion of a later trans-
gression, one of the group members fails to comply by showing mercy towards 
the transgressor, the other group members might indeed rebuke the member 
in question. A case like this, it seems, can be straightforwardly analysed in 
terms of the joint commitment account of collective emotions. Members of 
the group in question will be subject to the normative pressure that arises from 
their commitment to the mentioned principle. But this example is surely not 
a paradigmatic case of shared affects.
The problem is not merely that garden-variety cases of collective emotions 
don’t usually presuppose deliberation or explicit (verbal) agreements between 
the individuals taking part in them. In fact, such an objection would have 
little bite against the joint commitment account of collective emotions, since 
Gilbert holds, correctly in our view, that there can be non-verbal ascriptions 
of collective emotions. Although verbal ascriptions of collective emotion are 
the starting point of Gilbert’s most recent and general treatment of collective 
emotions, “How we feel: understanding everyday collective emotion ascrip-
tion” (Gilbert, 2014),2 she also concedes that there can be cases of collective 
emotions that don’t involve verbal exchanges. Recall the example, referenced 
in the previous section, of collective excitement about some piece of news. 
About this case, Gilbert writes: “No one need actually say “We are excited,” for 
it to be true. Nor would the involvement of words be necessary to justify the 
collective emotion ascription, given the initial announcement or some other 
happening that serves the same purpose. For instance, Stella comes into the 
room carrying the prize. The occurrence of appropriate non-verbal behavior 
would be enough” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 22).
While the admission that there can be non-verbal collective emotions gives 
 2 The title of the present paper is obviously indebted to the title of Gilbert’s chapter.
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more plausibility to the joint commitment account of collective emotions, 
Gilbert’s account presupposes that individuals taking part in a collective emo-
tion have a sufficiently robust conception of the kind of normativity involved 
in joint commitments. If collective emotions require joint commitment, and 
if the latter requires an expressed readiness to commit (under conditions of 
common knowledge), what should we say about cases featuring individuals 
who seem to lack the prerequisite cognitive capacities, but who nevertheless 
seem to have collective emotions? It is important to be clear about why this 
would be a challenge for the joint commitment account of collective emotions. 
The point is not that individuals who possess the concept of joint commitment 
should be able to articulate that concept in detail, and that individuals who are 
less cognitively sophisticated than human adults would not be in a position 
to do so.3 The point is rather that Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment refer-
ences “the commitment of two or more wills by two or more wills” (Gilbert, 
2018, p. 131), and that joint commitments are taken to have a binding force 
between the wills of individual parties, in the sense that “[e]ach has sufficient 
reason to act in accordance with the commitment.” (2013, p. 87). Applying this 
analysis to collective emotions of cognitively unsophisticated individuals seems 
implausible and misguided.
In the last decades, research in developmental psychology has debunked the 
view that neonates and young infants lack social competences for entering into 
intersubjective interactions. Quite to the contrary, it has been documented that 
from birth onwards, infants are sensitive to other people in ways in which they 
are not to inanimate objects (Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; 
Zahavi & Rochat, 2015). Infants show from birth a distinctive sensitivity to the 
mindedness of others, a natural responsiveness to others that signals not only 
an awareness of the differentiation between self and other, but also of patterns 
of connectedness between the two (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001, p. 6). From 
around 2–3 months of age, infants engage in mutual exchanges of gazes and 
smiles with caregivers. It has been shown that such exchanges or “proto-con-
versations” (Bateson, 1979) are cross-cultural, and have a structured character, 
involving turn-taking and specific timing (Trevarthen, 1998, p. 23). The social 
interactions that infants enter into at this stage of life are mutually coordinated 
between infant and caregiver, and they are also affectively loaded. They involve 
“the infant’s recognition of emotions and the capacity to react emotionally in 
differentiated ways” (Draghi-Lorenz, Reddy, & Costall, 2001, p. 274). Such 
 3 As Gilbert writes, “I take it that one can possess a concept without having the ability explicitly 
to give an account of it—just as one can know how to move one’s body in riding a bicycle 
without having the ability to describe precisely what is going on.” (2013, p. 9) 
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early interactions include not only “feelings of liking, dislike, shyness, sadness 
or annoyance, as well as inattention and sleepiness” (Trevarthen, 1984, p. 140), 
but also positive interest, affectionate pleasure, joy, sadness, anger, and humour. 
Proto-conversations provide for the context in which “for the first time self and 
other are engaged together in an open-ended, emotional bid building process” 
(Zahavi & Rochat, 2015, p. 548). 
These early affective exchanges do not seem to be automatic or reflex be-
haviours, insofar as their reciprocal character is fundamental for sustaining 
them. A dramatic illustration of this is the still-face experiment (Tronick, Als, 
Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978; Mesman, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 2009). In that experiment, an adult initially engages with the 
infant in a normal face-to-face interaction. This is followed by a period where 
the adult becomes unresponsive and poses a stationary expression (still-face). 
Infants as young as two months of age manifest a robust still-face response: they 
are sensitive to such interruptions of social interactions and not only do they 
attempt to reengage their social partner, by smiling, vocalizing and gesturing, 
but when this fails they display eye contact avoidance and distress. The general 
interpretation of such findings is not only that something in the gaze of the oth-
er is perceived by the infant as significant enough to arouse strong emotional 
reactions, but also that they have expectations about the way the face-to-face 
interactions should proceed, and about the nature of appropriate interactive 
responses from social partners (Rochat & Striano, 1999). The character of the 
mutual regulation and synchronicity of dyadic affective interactions in the first 
year of life has motivated researchers to talk about shared emotions at this stage 
of development (Krueger, 2014; Varga, 2016)
At around one year of age, early affective interactions become with the onset 
of triadic joint attention, and with it, of “secondary intersubjectivity” ((Trevar-
then, 1998, p. 31). Triadic joint attention is the infant’s capacity to perceptually 
attend to objects and events together with another subject, typically a caregiver 
(Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello, Butterworth, & Moore, 1998; Carpenter & 
Liebal, 2011; Tomasello, 1995). This capacity, which usually appears between 
9–12 months of age, is typically exercised because either the infant or the care-
giver direct the other’s attention to an object by means of an ostensive gesture, 
or because a salient external event attracts the attention of the infant and the 
caregiver. There is widespread agreement that triadic joint attention is different 
from parallel attention and mere gaze following (Rakoczy, 2018, p. 409). What 
is relevant for our purposes is that triadic joint attention provides a develop-
mental ground for sharing emotional responses to an object of interest, where 
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it is manifest to both co-attenders that they are focusing on the same object 
(Moll & Meltzoff, 2011b, 2011a).4
One line of support for the claim that joint attention scaffolds shared emo-
tional responses to an object of interest in early childhood, slightly later than 
the age at which triadic joint attention usually emerges, comes from research 
by Moll and colleagues. They have presented evidence that infants as young 
as 14 months are sensitive to, and able to track the affective significance that 
an object has had for ‘us’ (the infant and an adult), based on previous joint at-
tentional engagements with the object (Moll, Richter, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2008). In the experimental condition (Share Condition), an infant and an adult 
shared an object (or target) excitedly because it reappeared unexpectedly in 
several predefined places: on the floor of the hallway, under a piece of cloth in 
another location of the hallway, and inside a box. Afterwards, infant and adult 
shared two other objects in a more neutral way for the same length of time as 
they had shared excitement over the first object. In the subsequent test phase, 
infant and adult were presented with a tray containing all three objects. The 
adult then reacted excitedly to the three objects, making an ambiguous request 
to the infant of handing “it” to her. Most children chose the target object. There 
were two control conditions. In the first control condition (Adult Change 
Condition), a different adult, who hadn’t had contact with the objects, made 
the same ambiguous request to the infant. In the second control condition 
(Individual Condition), the infant only witnessed the adult experiencing the 
target object with excitement, without interacting with the adult. The results 
of the experiment indicate that, upon the ambiguous request from the adult, 
14-month olds tend to hand over the object that they had shared excitedly with 
her. The control conditions suggest that infants don’t do this because of their 
individual excitement about the object (independently of the person they had 
shared the experience with), or because of the adult’s own excited reaction to 
the target object, but rather because they (infant and adult) had shared a special 
experience about the object in the past. 
The fact that in the experiment by Moll and colleagues the significant or 
special way of interacting with the target object involved sharing excitement 
about it invites a comparison with Gilbert’s (admittedly brief ) treatment of 
collective excitement. In the first place, the experimental results could hardly 
be explained by appeal to the infant’s or the adult’s individual excitement about 
the target. So far, there is convergence with Gilbert’s insistence not to take for 
granted the validity of “summative accounts” of collective emotions (Gilbert, 
 4 For an account of shared emotions that highlights the role of joint attention in enabling 
shared emotional responses, see (León et al., 2017).
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2014, p. 21). However, infants in the experiment appear to be relying on a spe-
cific interpersonal and affective transaction with the adult, a transaction that 
justifies Moll and colleagues’ phrasing of “what ‘we’ have shared in a special 
way”, as distinguished from “just I or you alone” (Moll et al., 2008, p. 90). 
Let us now go back to Gilbert’s joint commitment account of collective 
emotions. How plausible is it to suppose that 14-month olds have the requisite 
capacities for having joint commitments, as understood by Gilbert, and that 
their shared experience of excitement with the adult about the target object 
would involve a joint commitment to be excited ‘as a body’? In our view, that 
proposal lacks plausibility. Note that possession of the concept of joint com-
mitment is not sufficient to get the collective emotion going. The parties to 
a joint commitment also have to understand that the expressed readiness to 
jointly commit happens under conditions of common knowledge (Gilbert, 2014, 
p. 24). As Gilbert explains elsewhere: “Common knowledge in general may be 
understood roughly as follows: there is common knowledge that p among certain 
parties if and only if the parties notice that the fact that p is open* with respect 
to all of themselves. As I define it, openness* involves, roughly, many levels of 
potential knowledge of one another’s knowledge” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 43). Now, 
if possession of the concept of openness* involves the possibility of exercising 
recursive mindreading, as suggested in this passage, it is implausible to attribute 
it to 14-month olds (Miller, 2009). If it doesn’t, how precisely should openness* 
be understood in the case of young infants?5 At any rate, on Gilbert’s account, 
entering into joint commitments appears to require not only the possession of 
the concept of joint commitment, but also of the concept of openness*, and 
this introduces a further challenge of the joint commitment account of collec-
tive emotions in further childhood. 
Let us now consider the two following rejoinders. In the first place, one 
might say that early forms of affective sharing over an object of attention, as il-
lustrated by the experiment by Moll and colleagues, do not qualify as collective 
emotions as analysed by Gilbert. Even if such early forms of shared affectivity 
are non-verbal phenomena, they would be, at best, precursors to collective 
emotions proper, as found in adults. One challenge for this reply, however, 
is to specify when in development we would then be warranted in talking of 
 5 Gilbert’s full definition of openness* involves reference to her concept of a “smooth reasoner 
counterpart of a person X”, which is “roughly, a being otherwise like X, but whose reason-
ing is untrammelled by limits of time, memory capacity, and perseverance”(Gilbert, 1989, p. 
191). Moreover, she supposes that “human beings generally possess the concept of openness*, 
and that this is effectively known by all adult humans” (Gilbert, 1989, p. 191). Whether, and 
if so, how Gilbert’s understanding of openness* would apply to cognitively unsophisticated 
individuals is not something that she discusses, as far as we know. 
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collective emotions proper, and not merely of precursors to them. Recall that, 
on Gilbert’s account, joint commitments need not be verbally expressed. The 
issue is, at best, open: when in development would collective emotions proper 
appear, and what would warrant the postulation of a difference between pre-
cursors to collective emotions, and collective emotions proper? 
A second way of responding to the criticism would be to argue that joint 
commitment comes in different forms, and that it might be appropriate to 
introduce a rather minimal form of it, one that could be attributed to young 
children, even though they lack a sophisticated understanding of common 
knowledge and the normative elements that are part of Gilbert’s approach 
(Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016, p. 4). One of the core suggestions be-
hind this proposal has been the idea that mere repetition can give rise to an 
implicit sense of commitment (Michael et al., 2016, p. 3). We consider this an 
interesting proposal, but in our view, it cannot save Gilbert’s account. Con-
sider that developmental studies suggest that only from around 3 years of age 
children begin to understand the kind of commitment involved in cooperative 
activities, such as playing games together (Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). The experiment 
by Moll and colleagues involved 14-month olds, and the shared excitement 
over the reappearing object did not happen in the context of a cooperative 
activity structured by a joint goal, but rather happened unexpectedly, due to 
the reappearance of the target object in different places. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the minimal approach to the sense of commitment should be seen 
not so much as a leaner version of Gilbert’s approach to joint commitment, 
but rather as departing from it in important respects (Michael et al., 2016, p. 
2).6 So even if the minimal approach to the sense of commitment could be 
applied to illuminate some aspects of phenomena of shared affectivity in early 
life, it wouldn’t automatically speak in favour of Gilbert’s joint commitment 
approach to collective emotions.
The case of shared affective responses in early infancy, even in situations 
where such responses are not structured by a joint goal, points to a more prin-
cipled objection to Gilbert’s joint commitment account of collective emotions. 
This objection is ultimately independent of developmental considerations, and 
it targets the very idea that Gilbert’s analysis of shared action can without fur-
ther ado be transferred to cases of shared affects. Here is arguably a far more 
prototypical case of collective emotion than the one we started with at the be-
ginning of this section. I watch a movie together with a friend. We both enjoy 
 6 One important difference between the two approaches is that the minimal approach to the 
sense of commitment focuses on psychological, rather than normative factors.
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the movie, or more accurately we enjoy the movie together. The enjoyment 
I feel as a result of seeing the movie together with my friend differs from the 
enjoyment I would have had, had I seen the movie on my own, and the same 
holds true for my friend. What we are dealing with here is not simply a case 
of emotional contagion. It is not simply a question of my enjoyment being 
intensified as a result of me being causally affected by my friend’s emotional 
state. It is not simply a question of a certain modulation of my experience of 
joy, but rather of an experience that is felt as ours, i.e., as co-owned, as one 
that we are feeling and experiencing together. A case of two people feeling joy 
together seems a prime candidate for a shared emotion. But how reasonable is 
it to claim that the emotion they have is a collective emotion precisely because 
of the involvement of a joint commitment? How plausble is it to insist that I 
would be entitled to rebuke the friend with whom I share the joy of watching 
the movie, if after some time he doesn’t find the movie enjoyable anymore? 
In many cases of collective emotions, we are bound together by affects that 
overwhelm us. We are affected by them. This aspect of affective life is referenced 
in the conceptualization of (some) emotions as passions, and in locutions such 
as being ‘overcome with joy’ and ‘overwhelmed by sorrow’ (Deonna & Teroni, 
2012, p. 1). But in these cases, where emotions are not directly influenced by 
the will, the notion of joint commitment seems to be of little relevance. This 
doesn’t mean that emotions, individual or collective, don’t have associated ac-
tion tendencies. The point is rather that there are relevant differences between 
shared action and shared affects that should prevent us from analysing all cases 
of the latter with the same tools that we use to analyse the former. 
Consider, further, what means would be available for testing the presence 
of a joint commitment in a collective emotion. At least in many cases, the 
appropriateness of an apology when breaking the joint commitment would 
testify for the presence of the latter. If so, however, there are many cases of 
collective emotions where such an apology makes little sense, such as in the 
example of collective joy when watching a movie together with someone. In 
the developmental literature, evidence suggesting that children only start from 
around 3 years of age to offer an apology or an excuse when they unilaterally 
break off from a joint activity has precisely been interpreted as indicating that 
they only than would have an understanding of joint commitments (Gräfen-
hain et al., 2009). 
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5. Mutual Recognition and Joint Commitment 
We have so far argued against the necessity of joint commitment for collective 
emotions, by drawing on research in developmental psychology, and by point-
ing to significant differences between actions and affects. We have also con-
sidered possible strategies Gilbert might take to respond to the challenge, but 
have suggested that they are unconvincing. In this section, we will supplement 
the preceding discussion with another line of argument, which focuses on the 
notion of mutual recognition. The argument builds on Gilbert’s assumption 
that mutual recognition is foundational in the sense that mutually recognized 
subjects “constitute a fundamental kind of social group” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 
332). Although we share this assumption, we will argue that Gilbert’s account 
of mutual recognition fails for reasons related to the ones we have discussed 
in preceding sections. In particular, we find problematic Gilbert’s claim that 
mutual recognizing “presupposes, for one, that the parties have the concept of 
joint commitment” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 333). 
As we have repeatedly seen, for Gilbert it is joint commitments that unifies 
us and makes us us (Gilbert, 2013, p. 331). A collective we can, however, vary 
in both complexity and duration. For Gilbert, the most basic form is the one 
established through mutual recognition. Those who mutually recognize each 
other constitute the simplest and most fundamental form of a social group 
(Gilbert, 2013, pp. 324, 332).7 Such a group will not yet have shared aims and 
values, but by recognizing one another, the members of the group have already 
started the process of forming a group with “character”. Social conventions, for 
instance, are in most cases established on a basis that involves mutual recogni-
tion (Gilbert, 2013, p. 333). Just like Gilbert, we readily concede that there are 
forms of collective intentionality that go beyond cases of face-to-face based 
mutual recognition, and that connect individuals who are not known to (and 
perhaps will never know) each other (Gilbert, 2013, p. 51). It is consequently 
important to be clear about the relationship between the unification obtaining 
between particular individuals who know each other, and more anonymous 
and institutionalized forms of such unification. While we agree with Gilbert 
on the primacy of the former, we have issues with the particular analysis that 
she offers. 
Gilbert considers mutual recognition to involve common knowledge of co-
presence (Gilbert, 2013, p. 324). When two people, A and B, engage in dyadic 
joint attention, i.e., when they are looking in each other’s eyes, it is common 
 7 Recognition is understood by Gilbert as “a more or less enduring state, like believing, as op-
posed to an event like noticing” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 332). 
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knowledge between A and B that A and B are co-present (Gilbert, 2013, pp. 
325–326). Gilbert also argues, however, that A and B are thereby jointly com-
mitted to recognize as one that they are both co-present (Gilbert, 2013, p. 329). 
Or as she also puts it, they are committed to act in relation to one another as if 
they are ‘of one mind’ with respect to the fact that they are co-present (Gilbert, 
2013, p. 330). It is not hard to see, why Gilbert has to argue like this. Had she 
allowed for mutual recognition to obtain without joint commitment, and had 
mutual recognition been both necessary and sufficient for the formation of a 
basic type of social group, Gilbert’s own claim concerning the centrality of joint 
commitment would have been undermined. According to Gilbert, mutual 
recognition—as exemplified by a case of being aware of someone’s co-presence, 
and by engaging in a minimal form of communication, such as nodding and 
smiling to each other—presupposes “that the parties have the concept of joint 
commitment” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 333).
One challenge to Gilbert’s account of mutual recognition can again be found 
in the developmental literature. 2–3 months olds infants can engage in dyadic 
joint attention and participate in simple forms of proto-conversations. Accord-
ing to Gilbert however, mutual recognition requires a possession of the concept 
of joint commitment (Gilbert, 2013, p. 333). It is not obvious that this claim 
accords with the developmental findings. Perhaps one could circumvent that 
challenge by opting for a much thinner notion of commitment. But we would 
then be confronted with the problem that by accepting a more deflationary 
notion one also dilutes the notion, and risks ending up with a fairly vacuous 
account, where the notion of joint commitment has little content.
Let us conclude, however, by briefly mentioning a different concern. As al-
ready mentioned, we agree with the idea that mutual recognition is important, 
but in our view, the main reason for this has to do with reasons Gilbert doesn’t 
address in her own account. It is not entirely clear to us whether Gilbert would 
actually oppose the following analysis, but it is in any case not one that to our 
knowledge has been spelled out in her own writings.
When one is feeling something with another, say feeling joy and pride to-
gether with the another, one is not simply feeling the joy and pride as mine, but 
as ours. How can this happen? How can one come to feel and experience one-
self as one of us? In its most basic form, a shared emotion involves emotional 
interpersonal interaction, where both participating individuals are reciprocally 
affecting and experiencing each other. We consequently hold that it is coun-
terintuitive to call a felt emotion ‘shared’ unless the subject of the experience is 
also aware of the presence and participation of the other(s), and vice-versa. One 
implication of this is that a shared emotion necessarily involves a preservation 
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of the difference between the participating individuals. Mere reciprocity is, 
however, not sufficient for shared emotions. After all, the former condition is 
also met by various kinds of antagonistic relationships. What more is needed? 
Not surprisingly, it seems urgent to get a better grip on the nature of the 
togetherness, i.e., the kind of integration that is required by shared emotions. 
The integration required goes beyond not only summation or aggregation but 
also beyond cases of mere coupling or co-regulation. One of the difficulties 
in fleshing out the required integration is that the depth or tightness of inte-
gration may well differ from case to case. One might witness a flutist playing 
on the street, and a sharing look and a smile might make it transparent that 
the delight is shared with another passer-by. Although such a case would not 
simply be a case of emotional contagion, such a form of sharing delivers only 
a quite ephemeral form of integration. Contrast this example with the kind 
of integration that can be found in the case of a romantic couple in which 
the partners’ tight integration and fully unified appraisal of, say, a happiness-
inducing situation would make it possible and appropriate for them to articu-
late the experience in ‘we’ terms. What marks the difference between these two 
ranges of cases? 
Our proposal is that identification makes the difference. To feel an emotion 
not simply as one’s own but as ours, requires that one identifies with the other(s) 
in order to experience oneself as one of us, where the latter expression is under-
stood in non-distributive terms. What is of primary importance here, however, 
is that this identification goes hand in hand with a certain transformation or 
modulation of the participating individual’s respective self-experience. There 
are different accounts available of how this might happen (see for instance 
Zahavi, 2015, 2019; León, Szanto, & Zahavi, 2017; León, 2018), but here we 
simply want to insist that an adequate account of collective emotions must 
factor in and account for this change, and in our view, Gilbert’s reference to 
joint commitments leaves this problem unaddressed.
6. Conclusion 
We in no way want to dispute that joint commitments can enhance, consoli-
date and add stability to many social phenomena, including some types of col-
lective emotions. However, we are sceptical about the proposal that joint com-
mitments are necessary for collective emotions, as Gilbert contends. We have 
argued that research in developmental psychology puts considerable pressure 
Felipe León and Dan Zahavi132
© ProtoSociologyVolume 35/2018: The Joint Commitment Account  
on such a proposal, and that consideration of everyday adult cases of collective 
emotions, such as enjoying a movie together with a friend, are not convincingly 
amenable to an analysis in terms of joint commitments. The phenomena of 
shared affectivity discussed by the developmental psychologists as well as the 
just mentioned example are counterexamples to Gilbert’s claim concerning the 
necessity of joint commitments for collective emotions. Moreover, while we 
concur with Gilbert’s proposal that face-to-face mutual recognition is foun-
dational for other types of social engagements, analysing mutual recognition 
in terms of joint commitments is equally implausible. Research on collective 
emotions is an ongoing endeavour, and much more could be said about the 
topic. We contend that, like other collective social phenomena, collective emo-
tions involve a sense of we-ness, or us-ness, that makes them different from 
solitary emotions. A plausible desideratum for an account of collective emotions 
is that it illuminates the nature of the shift that makes it possible for me to 
experience an emotion as ‘ours’.8 
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